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█ Abstract After the recent “cognitive turn” it is commonly assumed that the domain of the cognitive is 
much broader than the domain of the linguistic. Consequently, the quickly decreasing appeal of “linguistic 
idealism” is now totally clouded by the view that language is not necessary for thought. I here highlight 
how the target paper is fully attuned to this mainstream view, which originally and fundamentally rejects 
any linguistic idealist claim. Furthermore, I propose a new formulation of an “old” methodological con-
cern about psychological explanations, which potentially challenges the efficacy of any argumentative 
strategy hinging on higher order cognitive capacities. 
KEYWORDS: Psychological Explanation; Morgan’s Canon; Cognitive Turn; Mentalizing; Nonlinguistic 
Thought. 
 
 
 
█ Riassunto Croce e delizia delle spiegazioni psicologiche – Dopo la recente “svolta cognitiva” è diventata 
un’assunzione comune ritenere che il dominio della cognizione sia più ampio di quello del linguaggio. Di 
conseguenza, il repentino calo di attrattività da parte dell’“idealismo linguistico” è ora completamente 
oscurato dall’idea per cui il linguaggio non sia necessario per il pensiero. In questa sede vorrei sottolineare 
come le tesi dell’articolo target stiano in piena sintonia con questa concezione dominante, che rifiuta sin 
nei fondamenti ogni pretesa dell’idealismo linguistico. Vorrei inoltre proporre una nuova formulazione 
per una “antica” preoccupazione metodologica in materia di spiegazioni psicologiche, potenzialmente ca-
pace di porre in questione l’efficacia di ogni strategia argomentativa che faccia leva su capacità cognitive 
di ordine superiore. 
PAROLE CHIAVE: Spiegazioni psicologiche; Canone di Morgan; Svolta cognitiva; Mentalizzazione; Pensiero 
non linguistico. 
 
 
 
THE RECENT “COGNITIVE TURN” IN di-
sciplines dealing with mind, brain, and be-
havior, has triggered many significant chang-
es in the way in which both human and non-
human cognition is currently understood. In 
the last few decades, empirical studies from 
different fields have provided us with suffi-
cient evidence in support of the hypothesis 
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that higher-order cognitive capacities are not 
unique to linguistic creatures. 
Currently, research programs and practic-
es in the study of animal behavior, early hu-
man development, and human evolution, 
typically share the common assumption that 
the domain of the cognitive is much broader 
than the domain of the linguistic. In other 
words, the turn has triggered a dramatic 
change in perspectives on language and its 
relation to thought. The view that thought 
depends on language, so that the study of the 
thought is entailed by the study of language, 
has been seriously challenged. A new tenet is 
currently dominating the scene: language is 
not necessary for thought. Accordingly, the 
study of thought does not proceed from the 
study of language. 
Such context provides the standard theo-
retical framework for various disciplines. 
The study of animal behavior is now mainly 
shaped as cognitive ethology:1 studies are of-
ten designed on the assumption that animals 
act in accordance with their intentions, de-
sires, or fears; all the same, behavioral data 
are explained in terms of mental state attri-
butions.2 In developmental psychology, the 
widespread usage of the violation-of-expec-
tation paradigm,3 is an index attesting the 
deep influence of the cognitive turn in the 
study of prelinguistic children. In fact, the 
attribution of the capacity to make predic-
tions to infants is taken as an a priori as-
sumption at the very core of this specific 
methodological strategy, which aims at inve-
stigating infant knowledge, and conceptual 
understanding. 
Evolutionary anthropology, cognitive ar-
cheology, and the study of human prehistory 
are also in accordance with the cognitive ap-
proach, as they look for data, along the hom-
inid evolution, suggesting the possession of 
(higher-order) cognitive capacities far before 
the possible date of the emergence of lan-
guage.4 Finally, there is one more feature 
shaping the current debate on cognition, that 
is, the account of cognition and its relations 
to language is often tempered with an evolu-
tionary stance. 
This is not surprising, as the signs of the 
cognitive turn trace back to the writings of 
Charles Darwin, who first thematized the re-
search hypothesis, currently most widely ac-
cepted, that differences in intellect, commu-
nication, social skills, emotions, etc., across 
species are a matter of degree, rather than a 
matter of kind. Likely, such an hypothesis is 
the most striking one, when the differences 
between human and non-human animals are 
at issue. Hinges and threats of the cognitive 
approach are both envisaged in the following 
comment on vultures by Charles Darwin: 
 
These voltures certainly may be called 
gregarious, for they seem to have pleasure 
in society, and are not solely brought to-
gether by the attraction of a common 
prey. On a fine day a flock may often be 
observed at a great height, in the most 
graceful evolutions. This is clearly per-
formed for the mere pleasure of the exer-
cise, or perhaps is connected with their 
matrimonial alliances.5 
 
This comment allows us to appreciate 
Darwin’s “mentalizing” about vultures (they 
behave out of mere pleasure), as well as his 
more cautious premises (“…they seem to have 
pleasure…”), and afterthoughts (“…or perhaps 
is connected with their matrimonial allian-
ces”). Here, one critical aspect of the study of 
behavior, and more generally, of the treat-
ment of third-person data, becomes quite 
obvious: are we allowed to infer higher-
cognitive capacities from observed behavior? 
In other words, is it methodologically cor-
rect, to interpret third-person data in terms 
of beliefs, desires, hopes, and even con-
sciousness and self-awareness? 
This type of methodological problem has 
been discussed throughout the last century, 
and certainly the paradigm shift has dispelled 
suspicion about psychological explanations 
of nonlinguistic behavior. The body of evi-
dence about supposedly displayed higher-
order mental abilities in animals from vari-
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ous species as well as in young infants, argues 
in favor of a more naturalistic approach to 
cognition, one in which the role of language 
is not as pervasive in thought as it was once 
considered to be. Lately, and in accordance 
with the principles of the paradigm shift, the 
view that thought is essentially grounded in 
language, as is consciousness, is no longer so 
popular. 
Cosentino and Ferretti’s contribution is 
very well attuned to the recent turn to the 
cognitive, which regards thought as indepen-
dent from language. Along the lines of the 
mainstream perspective, they provide a criti-
cism of the position, labeled as “linguistic 
idealism”, which despite being a minor one, 
still enjoys the strong support of philosophers 
including, among others, Daniel Dennett, Pe-
ter Carruthers, and Andy Clark. Their as-
sessment of linguistic idealism is mainly 
based on the argument that some high-order 
capacities, namely, the capacity for metare-
presentation, and so-called Mental Time 
Travel (MTT), are not uniquely human; in 
support of such a conclusion, the authors 
present and discuss a collection of empirical 
data, suggesting that both metare-presen-
tation and MTT are indeed displayed to a 
certain degree by non-linguistic creatures. 
Thus, they conclude, (i) it is not the case 
that the capacity for metarepresentation and 
for MTT depend on language, and (ii) they 
should rather be understood as precursors of 
language. As a result, the claim of linguistic 
idealism, that thought is dependent on lan-
guage, is replaced by the claim that (iii) lan-
guage is dependent on thought. More im-
portantly, the discussion of metarepresenta-
tive capacities is used by the authors in sup-
port of an original account of the origin of 
human subjectivity, or sense of the self. 
Given the role traditionally attributed to 
metarepresentative capacities and MTT with 
respect to the formation of human subjectivi-
ty, they argue, from (i) and (iii), it follows 
that (iv) human subjectivity is also indepen-
dent from language in some essential way. 
From (iv) one can also infer the implicit 
claim that concepts such as “subjectivity” and 
“sense of the self” should not in principle be 
confined to the domain of the human: if the 
origin of (human) subjectivity, understood as 
sense of the self, is autonomous and inde-
pendent from language, then (v) it is possible 
that the sense of the self also applies to 
nonlinguistic creatures (although to a differ-
rent degree). 
Notably, (v) places itself at the most ex-
treme frontiers of the cognitivist horizon, if 
even the most optimistic Griffin cannot but 
denounce the intrinsic difficulties entailed by 
the question of subjective consciousness: 
 
The behavioristic admonition that scien-
tists cannot learn anything at all about 
nonhuman consciousness is rapidly be-
coming obsolete […] But determining the 
content of an animal’s conscious aware-
ness remains formidably difficult.6 
 
Moreover, as a common thread of the 
current dominant view on cognition, Griffin 
recalls the Darwinian tenet that any differ-
ence between human and non-human subjec-
tive consciousness «is probably one of de-
gree rather than kind».7 The resonance of 
the Darwinian tenet looms large in the target 
paper. In the light of the above reflections, 
the main challenge for the account proposed 
by the authors is not really linguistic ideal-
ism, and its potential arguments against the 
cognitive approach.  
If the cognitive approach, as well as the 
view defended in the target paper, attracts 
enemies, it is perhaps more likely, I would 
argue, that they will be found “in the house”. 
Admittedly, Griffin exactly points this out: 
 
However, scientists reluctant to infer sub-
jective consciousness in animals often 
claim that whatever an animal, or a hu-
man, does might be accomplished uncon-
sciously […] Total certainty is not attai-
nable, even when we inquire about the 
thoughts and feelings of our human com-
panions.8 
  Dolcini 
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To put it briefly, the cognitive paradigm 
seems to be intrinsically affected by the tradi-
tional philosophical disease of epistemic so-
lipsism, which in the contemporary debate 
extends well beyond the domain of the hu-
man. Yet, this disease is not really life-
threatening, given that, differently from De-
scartes, we might well be content even with a 
less than certain knowledge.  
In the current context, the behavioristic 
assumption that the mind and the mental 
should not be invoked when providing ex-
planations of observable data, has been dis-
missed at once. However, the methodological 
concern directly related to the old philoso-
phical disease, and affecting the turn to the 
cognitive at its very foundations, now calls 
for explanation. 
In fact, one main side effect of the cogni-
tive turn is the common usage of psychologi-
cal explanations applied to nonlinguistic 
creatures, be they young children, or non-
human animals. When discussing the results 
of empirical studies in experimental psycho-
logy, comparative psychology, or ethology, re-
searchers make use of mental terms for ex-
plaining observed behavior. The attribution of 
thoughts (beliefs, desires, hopes, fears, etc.) to 
nonlinguistic creatures constitutes the com-
mon practice of explanation, without which the 
cognitive research paradigm would not exist. 
In 1804, Lloyd Morgan thematized a 
methodological principle for experimental 
psychologists and comparative psychologists 
in particular, which is known as Morgan’s 
Canon. One of the formulations of the prin-
ciple is expressed in evolutionary terms: 
 
MC: In no case is an animal activity to be 
interpreted in terms of higher psychologi-
cal processes, if they can be fairly inter-
preted in terms of processes which stand 
lower in the scale of psychological evolu-
tion and development.9 
 
Morgan’s Canon might certainly be used 
to cast doubt on the very foundation of the 
cognitive turn, as it provides the grounds for 
rejecting the practice of explaining the be-
havior of non-speaking creatures in terms of 
beliefs and desires. However, such a metho-
dological principle is not to be intended as a 
version of the claim typical of logical beha-
viorism that the mental should be paraphra-
sed away and reduced to behavioral attitu-
des, nor it is suggested that we should get rid 
of psychological explanations entirely. A 
more cautious interpretation of Morgan’s 
Canon is offered by Bermudez: 
 
But, at minimum, Morgan was suggesting 
that we should not trust psychological ex-
planations of behavior unless we are con-
vinced that those explanations are indi-
spensable – that is to say, unless we are con-
vinced that the behavior in question cannot 
be explained in nonpsychological terms.10 
 
Thus, Morgan’s Canon constitutes more a 
cautious methodological principle, rather than 
a reason for abandoning the cognitive ap-
proach to the study of nonlinguistic beha-
vior. Similar to the precious role played by 
Ockham’s razor in limiting any metaphysical 
redundancy, the Canon functions as a mea-
sure for limiting recourse to “the mental”. In 
brief, and above all, the Canon indicates 
methodological prudence: the suggestion is 
to avoid using psychological explanations 
when they are not strictly necessary. 
The implicit assumption is, clearly, that psy-
chological explanations are placed at the higher 
levels on an explanatory scale; more-over, it is 
also automatically entailed that at the lower 
levels of the scale one finds simpler features, 
which are less demanding from both a meth-
odological and metaphysical point of view.  
It should be noted that Morgan’s Canon 
can be extended so as to incorporate the 
Darwinian tenet about degrees. The exten-
ded formula might sound like this: 
 
MC+: in no case is an animal activity to be 
interpreted in terms of higher psychologi-
cal processes, if it can be fairly interpreted 
in terms of processes which stand lower in 
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the scale of psychological evolution and 
development. Moreover, assuming that 
higher psychological processes themselves 
come in degrees, in no case is an animal 
activity to be interpreted in terms of 
higher-level psychological pro-cesses, if it 
can be fairly interpreted in terms of low-
er-level psychological processes. 
 
In particular, MC+ entails the idea that 
when explaining behavior in terms of, for ex-
ample, subjective consciousness, it is good 
practice to acknowledge the fact that subjec-
tive knowledge comes in degrees.  
Of course, this is not in conflict with the 
points made by Cosentino and Ferretti. At 
the same time, MC+ suggests prudence also 
in the consideration that a certain cognitive 
capacity (e.g., pretense play, metare-presen-
tation, deception, etc.) may possibly manifest 
dramatically diverse features across the vari-
ous degrees. Incidentally, my intuition is that 
the taxonomy of cognitive capacities (often 
shaped as “modules”) requires further inves-
tigation, as it constitutes the starting point 
for the practice of psychological explanation 
in empirical studies. 
Finally, the problems at issue might also 
be stated in epistemological terms. Suppose 
that nonlinguistic creatures do have thoughts 
(beliefs, desires, hopes, etc.): how are we to 
know their mental contents, given that we 
only have access to third-person data, as be-
havior or patterns of behavior? 
Clearly, the inference that is made by re-
searchers when attributing thoughts to 
nonlinguistic creatures on the sole basis of 
the collected behavioral data, resembles the 
inference at work on a daily basis for each of 
us, when engaged in explaining, and predict-
ing people’s behavior (leaving aside our own 
behavior).  
However, what makes the case of thought 
attributions to nonlinguistic creatures me-
thodologically problematic, is that we cur-
rently lack a proper understanding of how the 
thought of a nonlinguistic creature might dif-
fer from the thought of a linguistic creature. 
Moreover, it should be noted that the 
very idea that the study of thought depends 
on the study of language – a view only appar-
ently related to the thesis of linguistic ideal-
ism – is not necessarily incompatible with the 
existence of nonlinguistic thought. In fact, it 
may well be that a thinker entertains a 
thought without being able to express it. This 
is the place in which the methodological 
problem turns into a metaphysical one: in 
order to find strong support for the metho-
dology entailed by the cognitive research 
program, we would first need to explain the 
metaphysics of nonlinguistic thought.  
If thought can be understood indepen-
dently from language, then a better grasp of 
the distinctive traits of nonlinguistic thought, 
as well as a clearer idea of the extent to which 
nonlinguistic thought differs from linguistic 
thought, is especially desirable. 
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